Dr. James Openshaw

RUB
FOR2812
People
Dr. James Openshaw

jamesopenshaw0@gmail.com

https://www.jamesopenshaw.com

About Me
Publications

I joined the FOR 2812 research unit in November 2022 as a postdoctoral researcher on project P3.

I'm also a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy of Memory in Grenoble, where I lead the EU-funded Remembering Objects (2021–24) project.

My principal interests are in the philosophy of mind, but these have often take me into epistemology, the philosophy of language, and metaphysics. My work primarily explores interactions between singular thought (or reference), memory, and perceptual experience.

I received my DPhil (PhD) in Philosophy from the University of Oxford in August 2018. I've since held postdoc positions at the University of Haifa (2018–19) and, as recipient of a Mind Association award, at the University of Warwick (2020–21). In between these, I was a Teaching Fellow at the University of Edinburgh (2019–20).

2025

Is De Brigard a simulationist?

Michaelian, K., Álvarez, J. F., & Openshaw, J.

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 6

@article{MichaelianÁlvarezOpenshaw2025,
	author		=	{Michaelian, Kourken and Álvarez, Juan F. and Openshaw, James},
	title		=	{Is De Brigard a simulationist?},
	journal		=	{Philosophy and the Mind Sciences},
	volume		=	{6},
	month		=	{February},
	year		=	{2025},
	doi		=	{10.33735/phimisci.2025.11720},
}

2024

Reference in remembering: towards a simulationist account

Openshaw, J., & Michaelian, K.

Synthese, 203(3)

@article{OpenshawMichaelian2024,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James and Michaelian, Kourken},
	title		=	{Reference in remembering: towards a simulationist account},
	journal		=	{Synthese},
	volume		=	{203},
	number		=	{3},
	month		=	{March},
	year		=	{2024},
	doi		=	{10.1007/s11229-024-04508-z},
}

2023

(In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway?
Openshaw, J.
Philosophical Perspectives, 37(1), 290–307

@article{Openshaw2023, author = {Openshaw, James}, title = {(In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway?}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, volume = {37}, number = {1}, pages = {290–307}, month = {October}, year = {2023}, doi = {10.1111/phpe.12191}, }

Openshaw, J. (2023). (In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway? Philosophical Perspectives, 37(1), 290–307. http://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12191

2022

Does singular thought have an epistemic essence?

Openshaw, J.

Inquiry, 1–24

@article{Openshaw2022b,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James},
	title		=	{Does singular thought have an epistemic essence?},
	journal		=	{Inquiry},
	pages		=	{1–24},
	month		=	{December},
	year		=	{2022},
	doi		=	{10.1080/0020174x.2022.2155871},
}

Remembering objects

Openshaw, J.

Philosophers′ Imprint, 22

@article{Openshaw2022,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James},
	title		=	{Remembering objects},
	journal		=	{Philosophers′ Imprint},
	volume		=	{22},
	number		=	{0},
	month		=	{August},
	year		=	{2022},
	doi		=	{10.3998/phimp.699},
}

Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity

Openshaw, J., & Weksler, A.

Philosophical Studies, 179(11), 3325–3348

@article{OpenshawWeksler2022,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James and Weksler, Assaf},
	title		=	{Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity},
	journal		=	{Philosophical Studies},
	volume		=	{179},
	number		=	{11},
	pages		=	{3325–3348},
	month		=	{June},
	year		=	{2022},
	doi		=	{10.1007/s11098-022-01831-4},
}

2020

Thinking about many

Openshaw, J.

Synthese, 199(1-2), 2863–2882

@article{Openshaw2020,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James},
	title		=	{Thinking about many},
	journal		=	{Synthese},
	volume		=	{199},
	number		=	{1-2},
	pages		=	{2863–2882},
	month		=	{October},
	year		=	{2020},
	doi		=	{10.1007/s11229-020-02904-9},
}

2019

A puzzle about seeing for representationalism

Openshaw, J., & Weksler, A.

Philosophical Studies, 177(9), 2625–2646

@article{OpenshawWeksler2019,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James and Weksler, Assaf},
	title		=	{A puzzle about seeing for representationalism},
	journal		=	{Philosophical Studies},
	volume		=	{177},
	number		=	{9},
	pages		=	{2625–2646},
	month		=	{August},
	year		=	{2019},
	doi		=	{10.1007/s11098-019-01331-y},
}

2018

Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports

Openshaw, J.

Mind & Language, 33(4), 415–437

@article{Openshaw2018b,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James},
	title		=	{Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports},
	journal		=	{Mind & Language},
	volume		=	{33},
	number		=	{4},
	pages		=	{415–437},
	month		=	{May},
	year		=	{2018},
	doi		=	{10.1111/mila.12180},
}

Self-ascription and the de se

Openshaw, J.

Synthese, 197(5), 2039–2050

@article{Openshaw2018,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James},
	title		=	{Self-ascription and the de se},
	journal		=	{Synthese},
	volume		=	{197},
	number		=	{5},
	pages		=	{2039–2050},
	month		=	{April},
	year		=	{2018},
	doi		=	{10.1007/s11229-018-1781-0},
}

forthcoming

Does singular thought have an epistemic essence?

Openshaw, J.

Inquiry

@article{Openshaw0,
	author		=	{Openshaw, James},
	title		=	{Does singular thought have an epistemic essence?},
	journal		=	{Inquiry},
	volume		=	{},
	number		=	{},
	month		=	{},
	year		=	{forthcoming},
	doi		=	{10.1080/0020174X.2022.2155871},
}

About the research unit

The research unit FOR 2812 "Constructing scenarios of the past: A new framework in episodic memory" is a project funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG). The research unit studies the cognitive and neuronal mechanisms underlying scenario construction in episodic memory. We employ and integrate approaches from Philosophy, Psychology, and Experimental and Computational Neuroscience.

Contact

Universitätsstr. 150,
44801 Bochum, Germany

Tel: +49 (0)234 32 27996
Fax: +49 (0)234 32 14210